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Abstract
The empirical literature on the relationship between inequality and growth oﬀers
a contradictory assessment: Estimators based on time-series variation indicate a
positive link while estimators (also) exploiting the cross-sectional variation suggest
a negative relationship. The present paper (i) confirms this conflicting pattern
in an expanded dataset; (ii) proposes a simple theoretical framework to highlight
the biases associated with the diﬀerent techniques. We argue that mechanisms
generating a positive inequality-growth relationship work mainly in the short-run
and are reflected in diﬀerence-based estimators. In contrast, mechanisms generating
a negative relationship work over the longer term and are reflected in level-based
estimators. (JEL O11, O15, O43, C23)
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, theoretical work has come up with a substantial number of
channels through which inequality may aﬀect economic growth, either in a positive or in
a negative direction. These theoretical contributions have made clear that the impact
of inequality is quite complex and likely to depend on, among other things, the specifics
of a country (e.g., the stage of economic development; the extent of market failures;
the form of government) or the time horizon considered (e.g., short run vs. long run).
This ambiguity is also mirrored in the empirical literature which finds both significantly
positive and negative eﬀects, and sometimes no eﬀects at all.
Figure 1 here
Yet, a closer look at the empirical literature reveals an interesting pattern. Esti-
mates based on time-series variation only (e.g., estimations relying on fixed-eﬀects or
first-diﬀerences estimators such as those in Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000) consistently
find a strong positive impact of inequality on subsequent growth. On the other hand,
estimation methods which also or exclusively exploit the cross-sectional variation in the
data tend to find a negative relationship. Examples in this regard include Barro’s (2000)
random-eﬀects approach and earlier studies based on simple cross-country OLS estimates
(e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Deininger and Squire, 1998;
Clarke, 1995). These results in the literature can already be seen from a look at some
crude data. Panel a. of Figure 1 is based on time-series variation only. Exploiting multiple
observations within countries, it plots changes in the log GDP per capita (p.c.) against
changes in the lagged Gini coeﬃcient and reveals a mildly positive relationship. Panel
b. highlights the relationship in levels. It plots the log GDP p.c. against the lagged Gini
coeﬃcient and documents a clear negative link.1
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we show that the pattern
of existing results is indeed driven by the choice of methods rather than idiosyncratic
1Figure 1 is about inequality and GDP p.c., both in terms of first diﬀerences (a.) and levels (b.). It
is this variation that is exploited in the GMM estimation below (see equations 1 and 2 of Section 2.1).
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diﬀerences across studies (such as the selection of countries, time periods, or included
control variables). We do so by taking advantage of an expanded and more comprehensive
inequality dataset. Also in this much larger dataset, the first-diﬀerences GMM estimator
consistently finds a strong positive inequality-growth relationship while the system GMM
estimator (which also exploits the cross-sectional variation) identifies a strong negative
link in a broad set of poorer countries (and a positive link in just a small number of
high-income countries). Second, we interpret these results through the lens of the recent
theoretical literature on economic growth and development. We argue that the standard
regression equation underlying most empirical estimates is (mis-)specified in a way that
induces (i) the first-diﬀerence GMM estimator to systematically pick up the positive
(short—run) eﬀects of inequality; (ii) the system GMM estimator to reflect primarily the
negative (long-run) consequences. In other words, the paper’s second contribution is to
highlight and interpret the systematic biases associated with the standard approaches
rather than coming up with an unbiased estimator.
To convey our argument in a clear and concise way, we introduce a simple model which
reflects that the positive and negative eﬀects of inequality cluster in a specific way. In
the theoretical literature, inequality is said to promote growth by fostering aggregate sav-
ings (Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1955); by promoting the realization of high-return projects
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993); or by stimulating R&D (Foellmi and Zweimueller,
2006). On the other hand, inequality is expected to hamper growth by promoting expen-
sive fiscal policies (Perotti, 1993); by inducing an ineﬃcient state bureaucracy (Acemoglu
et al. 2008); by hampering human capital formation (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and
Moav, 2004); by leading to political instability (Bénabou, 1996); or by undermining the
legal system (Glaeser et al., 2003). Most of the positive eﬀects (e.g., those operating
through convex savings functions, market imperfections or innovative incentives) rely on
purely economic mechanisms. Arguably, these eﬀects materialize relatively fast, in the
short or medium run. Most of the negative eﬀects, however, involve the political process,
the change of institutions, the rise of socio-political movements, or they operate through
changes in educational attainment of the population. Most likely, these eﬀects take time
and materialize primarily in the long run.
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Based on these arguments, the contradictory evidence on the inequality-growth rela-
tionship can be reconciled in a natural way. Studies that exploit mainly the time-series
dimension of the data, such as the first-diﬀerences GMM estimator, regress changes in
(log) output on (slightly) lagged changes in inequality. When inequality goes up, the
positive short- or medium-run eﬀects are associated with positive changes in inequality
while the subsequent negative changes (i.e., those coming from the long-run eﬀects) are
treated as noise. Thus, the first-diﬀerences estimator only reflects the positive short- or
medium-run eﬀects but leaves out the adverse long-run consequences (see Figure 1a.).
In contrast, the system GMM estimator is likely to find a negative relationship, in
particular if (i) the negative long-run eﬀects dominate the positive short- or medium-run
eﬀects (which is more likely to be the case in poorer economies); (ii) if inequality is highly
persistent (which is actually true everywhere). Under these circumstances, the majority
of observations is either of the type “low level of inequality and high level of output”
or “high level of inequality and low level of output.” Hence, the system GMM estimator
(which also exploits the cross-country variation) tends to find a negative relationship (see
Figure 1b.) — which reflects the overall adverse impact of inequality.
The present paper is part of a small literature which tries to get a better grasp of
the empirical picture with respect to the inequality-growth relationship. Earlier contri-
butions include Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Voitchovsky (2005). The former paper
presents evidence suggesting that changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated
with reduced growth in the short run; as a result, the standard regression equation might
be mis-specified in a way that — misleadingly — makes diﬀerences-based estimators in-
dicate a positive relationship. Voitchovsky (2005), by contrast, argues that inequality
coming from the top end of the income distribution is indeed likely to promote economic
growth while bottom-end inequality tends to be harmful. She therefore suggests control-
ling separately for inequality coming from diﬀerent parts of the distribution (and finds
supportive evidence in a panel of rich countries). None of these papers, however, focuses
specifically on the time dimension, and so we view this paper as complementary. Finally,
on a broader level, our study contributes to a growing body of research (e.g., Hauk and
Wacziarg, 2009) on the bias properties of standard estimation methods that are used in
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the empirical growth literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical
results and links them to the earlier literature. In Section 3, we introduce a model to
interpret our findings through the lens of the theoretical literature. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Results
We now apply the standard estimators to a common dataset, relying on a common set
of controls. We find the inequality-growth relationship to be consistently positive when
we rely on time-series variation only. However, when we also exploit the cross-sectional
variation, the relationship turns significantly negative in a broad sample of poorer coun-
tries. This suggests that the pattern of existing results is driven by the choice of methods
rather than idiosynchratic diﬀerences across studies (such as the selection of countries,
time periods, or control variables).
2.1 Specification and Estimation
Specification and data. We rely on a standard 5-year panel data model which is
similar to those used in several recent empirical studies on growth (e.g., Caselli et al.,
1996; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005). Specifically, we estimate
 − −1 = −1 + x0δ +  +  +  (1)
where  = 1 · · ·  denotes a particular country and  = 1 · · ·  is time (with  and − 1
five years apart). The variable  stands for the log of real GDP p.c. so that the left-hand
side of equation (1) approximates country ’s five-year growth rate in the years between
 − 1 and . On the right-hand side, we have −1 to control for convergence; a vector
x consisting of variable country characteristics; a period-specific eﬀect  to capture
productivity changes common to all countries; a country-specific eﬀect  to capture time-
invariant and unobserved country characteristics; an idiosyncratic error term 
The vector x consists of the Gini index and three additional standard control vari-
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ables. In line with the recent literature (e.g., Perotti, 1996; Forbes, 2000), these additional
variables are the average years of secondary schooling in the population aged over 25 (sep-
arately for males and females) and the price level of investment (to control for market
distortions). In general, the explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of each
5-year period. In case of inequality, this is not always possible because the Gini index is
not usually available on an annual basis. In these cases, we take the last available value
in the previous 5-year period.
The analysis includes up to 90 countries and covers the period from 1966 to 2005. The
GDP per capita data comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006)
and is in constant 2000 US$. The Deininger and Squire (1996) data base serves as the
primary source for the inequality data. However, in order to broaden our sample in the
cross-sectional as well as the time-series dimension, we also rely on a subsidiary source, the
UNU-WIDER (2008) data base.2 Finally, the education data comes from Barro and Lee
(2001) and the source for the price of investment is Heston et al. (2006; PWT 6.2). More
detailed sources and definitions, as well as summary statistics, are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 here
Estimation methods. It is well-known that the standard panel data methods (i.e.,
fixed-eﬀects [FE] and random-eﬀects [RE] estimations) are unlikely to provide consistent
estimates of  and δ (see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001). Obviously, using the RE estimator is
problematic because the unobserved country eﬀect,  is presumably correlated with the
other explanatory variables. A second problem emerges when we rewrite model (1) as
 = ( + 1)−1 + x0δ +  +  +  (2)
Equation (2) highlights that controlling for convergence in a panel data growth model
introduces a lagged dependent variable. As a result, even if equations (1) and (2) gave
an accurate description of reality, both the RE estimator and the FE estimator would be
2At the end of Table 1, we describe how our inequality dataset is constructed and how some pitfalls
associated with the use of secondary datasets (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001) have been addressed.
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very likely to give inconsistent estimates of the parameters  and δ
To deal with these problems, the literature has developed specific GMM estimation
techniques, most notably the first-diﬀerence GMM estimator and the system GMM esti-
mator. The first-diﬀerence GMM estimator was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
and is similar to the FE estimator in the sense that it exploits only within-country vari-
ation. The idea is to eliminate the country-specific eﬀect by diﬀerencing model (2) and
then to use suﬃciently lagged values of  and x as instruments. However, although the
first-diﬀerence GMM estimator “solves” the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and
lagged dependent variables, it has been criticized for the fact that it does not make use
of the variation in levels. The main concern is that the cross-sectional variation embodies
a large part of the information since within-country inequality is quite persistent.3 Thus,
ignoring this cross-sectional variation may give rise to unnecessarily large biases and im-
precision. One way to address these shortcomings is to use the system GMM estimator
pioneered by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). While requiring
a more stringent set of restrictions,4 the system GMM procedure does better in terms of
eﬃciency since — like the RE estimator — it also exploits the cross-country variation in
the data (see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001, for the details).
In what follows, we will apply both GMM estimation techniques to our expanded
dataset and document that — consistent with the existing empirical picture — the two
approaches may lead to systematically diﬀerent estimation results. Section 3 is then
devoted to explaining these diﬀerences across methods with the help of a simple model.
2.2 Results
Time-series variation only. We now go through the first-diﬀerence estimation results.
To connect with the previous literature, we first present evidence based on a sample which
is similar to that in Forbes (2000) in terms of countries included and periods covered. We
3This observation also applies to our dataset: The adjusted 2 from a regression of the Gini coeﬃcient
on country dummies is 084 (and rises only to 085 if time dummies are also included).
4For the instruments used by this estimator to be valid, the Blundell-Bond (1998) requirement must
be satisfied. In the context of growth regressions, this means that there must not be a systematic link
between a country’s fixed eﬀect and its distance from the steady state (see Roodman, 2009).
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then show that these results are quite robust to the inclusion of additional countries and
more recent observations as well as to a number of other modifications.
The first column of Table 2 gives the results based on the Forbes sample (which
includes 42 countries and covers the 1965-1995 period). Like Forbes, we find a significant
positive impact of inequality on growth, and the magnitude of the eﬀect is very similar:
On an annualized basis, our estimates imply a coeﬃcient of 00015 while Forbes (2000)
reports one of 00013. As the second column shows, the coeﬃcient on inequality remains
significant and comparable in size after extending the sample by two additional 5-year
periods (i.e., the 1996-2000 and 2001-2005 periods). Similarly, as documented in the
third column, the inclusion of 28 additional countries does not change the basic empirical
finding: Higher inequality has a significantly positive impact on (short-run) growth, albeit
the eﬀect is somewhat smaller in the broader country sample (which includes a larger
fraction of less-advanced countries).5
Table 2 here
The remaining columns of Table 2 document the robustness of this empirical outcome
to some natural variations. First, the estimates in columns (4) and (5) are based on sub-
sets of the full sample. Specifically, column (4) shows the impact of inequality in countries
which are classified as high income or upper-middle income (according to the 2009 World
Bank definition); column (5) provides the corresponding results for the remaining coun-
tries (lower-middle income or low income). Apparently, although the two subsets contain
very diﬀerent economies, the estimated impact of inequality is still significantly positive
in both cases and also of very similar size across the two country groups.
The second modification concerns the time structure of the panel. In order to check
whether the above results are not just an artifact of the 5-year structure, the estimates
in columns (6) and (7) are based on four 10-year periods. The results suggest that higher
inequality tends to foster growth also over this medium time horizon, and the size of the
5Note that 20 of these 28 additional countries are low income or lower-middle income countries accord-
ing to the classification by the World Bank (2006). As a result, in the full sample, 47% of the countries
fall into these two categories (while the rest belong to the categories upper-middle or high income).
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estimated impact is somewhat larger: For instance, on an annualized basis, the coeﬃcient
in the fourth column (5-year periods; high and up-mid countries) is 000082 while the
corresponding coeﬃcient for the 10-year structure is 000114. However, the estimates are
less precise — which is not surprising given the much smaller number of observations.
The validity of the first-diﬀerence estimator depends on the absence of serial correlation
in the error terms,  This means that the diﬀerenced error terms should not show second-
order serial correlation (though they have a first-order correlation by construction). The
statistics1 and2 in Table 2 give the -values associated with the tests for, respectively,
first-order and second-order correlation in the 4−series. As the numbers show, serial
correlation may only be an issue in the first regression (Forbes replication) but not in
columns (2) — (7). Finally, the high -values on the Hansen test also indicate that the
joint validity of the instruments cannot be rejected. Yet, -values close to 1 suggest that
there might be a problem of “too many instruments” (as discussed in Roodman, 2009).
We will return to this issue below.
Time-series and cross-sectional variation. Table 3 presents the results based on
the system GMM estimator. The first column presents the estimates based on the full
sample. Unlike in all the regressions shown in the previous table, the estimated impact
of inequality on growth is now negative, yet not significantly so.6 More precise results
can be gained by splitting the country sample along income classes (columns 2 — 4). It
turns out that, as shown in the second column, the system GMM estimates also indicate
a positive impact of inequality among the small group of high-income countries. However,
there is no significant relationship among upper-middle income countries (third column),7
and — most importantly — the system GMM estimates indicate a negative impact in the
large group of countries with lower-middle income or low income (fourth column). Note
further that switching to a 10-year structure again confirms the results obtained under
6Note that the number of countries in the sample increases from 70 to 90. The reason is that the
first-diﬀerence estimator requires at least three consecutive observations of . This is not true in the case
of the system GMM estimator which allows for moment conditions stemming from the regression equation
in levels: Since there are predetermined variables (lagged values of which can be used as instruments),
there exist moment conditions which do not require consecutive observations of .
7If we combine — as in Table 2 — high-income countries and upper-middle income countries in one
sample, the estimated coeﬃcient on inequality is insignificant (result not reported in the table).
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the 5-year structure (columns 6 and 7 of Table 3).
Table 3 here
So, even though the test statistics at the bottom of Table 3 support the validity of
the instruments with this estimation strategy too, the system GMM approach paints a
decidedly diﬀerent picture than the first-diﬀerence estimator: While the latter uniformly
points to a positive relationship (and thus confirms the results of, e.g., Li and Zou, 1998;
Forbes, 2000), the findings here suggest that the impact of inequality on growth is negative
(or at least non-positive) in countries which are not among the richest. Note that this
result is perfectly in line with Barro’s (2000) RE analysis (which also exploits cross-
sectional as well as time-series variation) and also matches the results in earlier OLS-based
studies such as those of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Persson and Tabellini (1994).
2.3 Robustness Issues
Additional controls. In choosing our explanatory variables, we follow the standard
specification used by, among others, Perotti (1996) and Forbes (2000). However, we
also explored whether other specifications would change our results. In particular, we
ran additional regressions which included further explanatory variables that are used in
the empirical growth literature, namely the investment rate and the population growth
rate (as, for instance, in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). The results are shown in
Appendix B, Table 4. The basic picture is that the baseline results reported in Tables 2
and 3 are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables. Regarding the impact of
inequality in the full sample, the only notable diﬀerence is that system GMM estimator
finds a significantly negative impact when the investment rate is added as an explanatory
variable (Table 4, column 6). To save space, Table 4 does not show the system GMM
estimates for the diﬀerent country sub-samples. However, we can report that the inclusion
of the additional controls does not significantly change the baseline estimates shown in
columns (2) to (4) of Table 3 (detailed results available upon request). Consistent with
the findings in the full sample, the only diﬀerence is that the impact of inequality is
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no longer significantly positive among high-income countries (but remains significantly
negative among lower middle- and low-income countries).
Reducing the instrument count. Following the existing literature (e.g., Forbes,
2000), we have not restricted the set of internal instruments relied upon (by default)
by the two GMM techniques. Yet, as discussed in Roodman (2009), using an unrestricted
set of moment conditions may give rise to a “problem of too many instruments” — which
expresses itself in a weakened Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. To address
this problem, we followed Roodman and re-ran our regressions using “collapsed instru-
ments” (see Roodman, 2005, Section V). The result of this exploration is that our baseline
findings are fairly robust. When we redo the main first-diﬀerence GMM estimation re-
ported in Table 2, which is the one in column (3), we find that the impact of inequality
is of about the same size, though the coeﬃcient is no longer significantly diﬀerent from
zero. The -value on the Hansen test drops substantially to 012 but still suggests that
the joint validity of the instruments cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Similarly, when
we redo the system GMM estimation reported in Table 3, column (2), we find the point
estimate to be largely unchanged but no longer significantly diﬀerent from zero (while
the -value on the Hansen test is still 0961). Finally, when we redo the system GMM
estimation in column (4), we continue to find inequality to have a significantly negative
impact (and the -value on the Hansen test is 046).
3 Interpreting the Empirical Results
The present section looks at how these seemingly contradictory estimation results can be
interpreted and reconciled. We first discuss that, in fact, the existing literature suggests
that both relationships should be present in reality. In the second step, we introduce
a simple model which summarizes the literature in a parsimonious way. With the help
of the model, we then argue that regression equation (1) is mis-specified so that the
two diﬀerent GMM estimators are prone to systematically reflect just one of the two
relationships, namely the positive one in the case of the diﬀerences-based approach and
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the negative one if the estimator also exploits cross-sectional variation.
3.1 Short-run and Medium-run Eﬀects vs. Long-run Eﬀects
Inequality aﬀects growth through many channels, and theoretical work discusses both
negative and positive eﬀects. Yet, as the following overview shows, there seems to be clear
pattern in the literature: The positive eﬀects rely on purely economic mechanisms and
should therefore be expected to set in fast. The negative eﬀects, on the other hand, often
involve political-economy arguments; as a result, they may need more time to materialize.
As to the positve channels, the literature has long argued that savings functions tend to
be convex in wealth (see, e.g., Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1955). So, other things equal, higher
inequality is associated with higher aggregate savings and thus faster convergence to the
balanced growth path. More recently, the focus has been on the impact of inequality on the
selection of investment projects (see, e.g., Matsuyama, 2000, in particular Section 4). The
main argument here is that, if the financial system is imperfect, access to external finance
depends on personal wealth. As a result, if wealth is widely spread among the population,
nobody may be able to raise suﬃcient funds to realize high-return projects which require
large investments. In this case, a more concentrated distribution of productive assets may
put at least a limited number of entrepreneurs into a position to realize such projects
— and thus boosts growth.8 This eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that the high-return
projects are often the more risky ones (see, e.g., Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). As
a result, with a relatively equal wealth distribution, the number of entrepreneurs who are
suﬃciently rich to absorb significant risks may be very small. So, once again, a more
concentrated distribution of wealth may multiply the number of high-return projects
realized. Finally, the literature also discusses positive demand-side eﬀects. With a more
unequal distribution, a larger fraction of total demand falls on “high-end” products (as
opposed to goods satisfying basic needs). Thus, innovators benefit from larger home
markets which more easily support the investments required to develop novel or better
8It has also been argued that, with convex technologies and financial markets imperfections, higher
inequality deteriorates economic performance because investment returns are more heterogeneous. How-
ever, as shown by Foellmi and Oechslin (2008), this is by no means a robust theoretical prediction.
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varieties (see, e.g., Foellmi and Zweimueller, 2006).
While working through diﬀerent channels, these positive eﬀects have one thing in
common: They emphasize purely economic mechanisms and therefore tend to materialize
fast. This is not true for the negative channels. Most of them rely on political-economy
arguments. For instance, it has been pointed out that more unequal societies tend to
have higher levels of redistribution and hence higher levels of taxation — which weakens
the incentives to save and invest (see, e.g., Perotti, 1993). A related argument focuses
on the composition of government expenditures. With higher inequality, the decisive
voter supplies fewer production factors (i.e., physical or human capital). As a result, he
may strongly prefer direct transfers over productive investments in public goods. Finally,
even if the rich hold political power, inequality may still have a negative impact via the
fiscal policy channel. As highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2008), if inequality is high,
an oligarchic government may set up an ineﬃcient bureaucracy to avoid high taxation
once the country is transformed into a democracy.9 Yet, via these channels, changes in
inequality cannot be expected to have an immediate eﬀect. It takes time for shifts in policy
preferences to be reflected in similar changes within the legislative body. Moreover, even
with a fresh legislature in place, altering tax laws (or even changing the bureaucracy)
is time consuming. Further negative eﬀects are also unlikely to materialize quickly. If
higher inequality reduces spending on education (see, e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor
and Moav, 2004), it may take a decade for the eﬀects to be felt. Similarly, it may be a
long time before disaﬀection caused by higher inequality is bundled in social movements
which then may threaten political stability (see, e.g., Bénabou, 1996) or before higher
inequality has undermined the security of property rights (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2003).
Note, finally, that many of these negative long-run eﬀects are probably less pronounced
in richer economies where technologies are more advanced and democracy tends to be bet-
ter established. For instance, inequality is less likely to promote political instability in
democratic environments which oﬀer broad participation in the political process. Simi-
larly, more advanced technologies are more dependent on an adequate supply of public
9More generally, based on the experience of the colonization of the New World, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman
(2000) argue that huge wealth inequalities may promote institutions that protect the privileges of the elites
and restrict opportunities for the broad masses — with adverse consequences for economic development.
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goods (i.e., fast enforcement of private contracts; reliable power supply) so that even rel-
atively poor people tend to be cautious when demanding more transfers at the expense
of productive public investment.
3.2 A Formal Approach
We now present a simple model which includes both a positive short-run eﬀect (i.e., an
economic channel) and a negative long-run eﬀect (i.e., a political-economy channel) of
inequality. We then use this model to suggest a natural interpretation of the empirical
findings in Section 2 and discuss how this interpretation depends on three three crucial
magnitudes, the short-run eﬀect, the long-run eﬀect, and the persistence of inequality.
3.2.1 A Parsimonious Model
Assumptions. We focus on an infinite-horizon economy which is populated by a con-
tinuum of individuals of measure 1. All agents derive utility from consumption of a single
(non-storable) output good, and preferences are represented by the utility function
 = 
( ∞X
=0
+
)
 (3)
whereas  denotes consumption in period . Individuals diﬀer regarding their endowment
with the productive asset (which we may interpret as “skills”, for instance). A fraction
  12 of the population (the “poor”,  ) is endowed with  ()  1 units of this asset,
whereas 1 is the average endowment in the economy. The endowment of the remaining
agents (the “rich”, ) is then given by () = (1 −  ())(1 − )  1 The
state variable  ∈ {} represents the degree of inequality, whereas  stands for low
inequality so that  ()   (). Note further that, at the beginning of each period,
inequality may change exogenously. In particular, we have  = −1 with probability 
and  6= −1 with probability 1−  Thus, a high value of  mirrors strong persistence
in inequality In practice, a change in the distribution of skills may be due to a shock to
the educational system which improves the quality of primary education relative to that
of university education, for instance.
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Suppose further that the individuals have access to a linear technology of the form
( ) = ()() (4)
with  ∈ {} whereas  is a group-specific productivity parameter and () denotes
the level of the public good provided by the government. Rich agents are assumed to be
more productive than the poor:     A natural way to think of this assumption is
that the more productive technology requires a certain skill level which cannot be achieved
by the poor.10 The state variable  ∈ {0 1} reflects whether — in the previous period
— the government has invested in the public good, with 1 indicating investment. Hence,
(1)−(0) ≡ 4  0
On the aggregate level, we can now infer that (private-sector) output is given by
 ( ) = ¡ − ( −  ) ()¢() (5)
Other things equal,  is higher in the high-inequality state ( = ) since a larger fraction
of the productive asset is allocated to the high-return technology; similarly, output is
higher if the level of the public good is high ( = 1). In what follows, we impose
(1)−(0)
(1) ()−(0) ()  
 − 
  (6)
so that  ( 1)   ( 0). This condition ensures that the long-run eﬀect of inequality
is quantitatively more important than the short-run eﬀect.
Turning to the public sector, suppose that the government has access to an income
stream of  units of the final good. We can think of this income as arising from a
publicly owned enterprise, the natural resource sector, etc. Regarding public spending,
the government has to decide on +1 in each period . A decision to invest is associated
with a contemporaneous cost of    units of the final good. The budget surplus is
distributed to the population in a lump-sum manner. Finally, when deciding on +1 we
10More generally, this assumption can be seen as a reduced-form representation of the notion that only
relatively rich people can rely on high-return technologies because — as discussed in Subsection 3.1 — the
financing of such technologies requires good access to the financial system (which the poor lack).
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assume that the government has no choice but to implement the variant preferred by the
majority of the population, i.e., the poor.
Equilibrium. We now describe the diﬀerent possible equilibrium patterns of public
investment and discuss which pattern emerges under what parameter constellation.
Proposition 1 (i) The politico-economic equilibrium shows fluctuations in the provision
of the public good, with a positive level of investment in times of low inequality (i.e.,
+1 = 1 if  = ) and no investment in times of high inequality (i.e., +1 = 0 if
 = ) if
4
 
 ¡ () + (1− ) ()¢ ≥ 1  4  ¡ () + (1− ) ()¢  (7)
Otherwise, the public good is always provided (if 1 is smaller than the last expression
in 7) or never provided (if 1 is bigger than the first expression in 7).
(ii) More advanced economies (as proxied by the productivity parameter  ) are more
likely to experience an invariably positive supply of the public good, other things equal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, when condition (7) holds, the poor prefer direct transfers over public in-
vestment if inequality is high: High inequality means that the poor can gain little from
the public good since they own only a small fraction of the productive asset. In the case of
low inequality, however, this gain is suﬃciently strong to make the poor prefer investment
over higher lump-sum transfers. On the other hand, if condition (7) is violated, the gain
from public investment is such that the poor consistently favor or oppose the provision of
the public good. Finally, the proposition also highlights that access to more productive
technologies makes the poor more likely to consistently favor the provision of the public
good (over higher transfers).
Inequality and output. The link between inequality and output is most involved if
condition (7) holds. Then, the prediction is that an increase in inequality leads to a
short-run increase and a long-run fall in output. Corollary 1 discusses the associated
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co-movements of inequality and output in terms of changes. Corollary 2 looks at the
relationship in levels.
Corollary 1 Suppose that conditions (6) and (7) hold. Moreover, assume that inequality
has been unchanged between periods − 2 and − 1 Then,
(i) a rise in inequality in  leads to a contemporaneous rise in output: −1 =  ( 1) 
 =  ( 1); in + 1, output falls, with inequality either unchanged or decreasing.
(ii) a fall in inequality in  leads to a contemporaneous fall in output: −1 =  ( 0) 
 =  ( 0); in + 1, output rises, with inequality either unchanged or increasing.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that the level of the public good is a state variable
and thus cannot change quickly. So an increase in inequality must lead to a positive eﬀect
on output in the short run (i.e., with  still at the high level) but to a negative one in the
long run (i.e., when the rise in inequality has undermined to supply of the public good).
Corollary 2 Suppose that the conditions (6) and (7) hold. Moreover, assume that in-
equality is persistent (i.e., that  is “high”). Then, over time,
(i) a large fraction of the observations ( ) will either be “low” inequality and
“high” output, (  ( 1)) or “high” inequality and “low” output ( ( 0))
(ii) very few observations ( ) will either be “low” inequality and “very low” output,
(  ( 0)) or “high” inequality and “very high” output, ( ( 1))
The central point behind Corollary 2 is persistence in inequality. Persistence means
that periods with changes in inequality — which generate observations of the type (“high”
inequality/“very high” output) or (“low” inequality/“very low” output) — are infrequent.
The link between inequality and output is much simpler if condition (7) is violated.
Then, the supply of the public good is constant over time so that “high” inequality is
always associated with “high” output and “low” inequality with “low” output (similarly,
a rise in inequality is always associated with an increase in output, and vice versa).
3.2.2 Reconciling Diﬀerences- vs. Level-based Estimates
We now demonstrate that, if public investment fluctuates, the estimated sign of the
inequality-output relationship depends on the estimation method (while it is invariant if
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public investment is stable). We then interpret the empirical results in Section 2 through
the lens of this model.
Figure 2 here
Fluctuating supply of the public good. Suppose that the supply of the public good
fluctuates, a situation which — according to Proposition 1 — is more likely to emerge
in poorer than in richer economies. To demonstrate the decisive role of the estimation
method under these circumstances, we combine the information in Corollaries 1 and 2 in
a single picture, Figure 2. To see how the figure is constructed, consider an increase in
inequality in period . If the focus is on changes (Panel ), the following observations
are generated: Observation −1 in period  − 1, observation 0 in period  (when the
short-run eﬀect materializes), and — in period + 1 — observation 1 (if  is unchanged
in  + 1 so that only the long-run eﬀect materializes) or observation 1 (if  decreases
in +1 so that the long-run eﬀect materializes together with a negative short-run eﬀect).
The remaining observations in Panel  can be generated by going through the opposite
case, i.e., by considering a decrease in inequality in period . Note that the numbers in
Panel  refer to the same thought experiments, but from the perspective of the levels.
The two panels further indicate the theoretical frequencies with which the diﬀerent types
of observations occur.
Figure 2 illustrates that the diﬀerent aspects of the relationship between inequality
and output are picked up by diﬀerent estimation methods. If the relationship is assessed
on the basis of changes (Panel ), we can see that estimating a linear regression would
give us a clear positive relationship. On the other hand, if levels are considered (Panel
), fitting a linear trend line would arguably point to a significant negative impact of
inequality (since the observations marked by a bigger dot are much more numerous than
the remaining observations).
We now establish analytically how close the diﬀerent estimation methods come in
identifying the diﬀerent aspects of the inequality-output relationship. We start by deriving
the formal relationship between output and inequality, assuming that conditions (6) and
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(7) hold. Taking logs on both side of equation (5) gives us
 ≡ ln = ln
µ
1− 
 − 
 
 ()
¶
+ ln
µ
1 +
4
(0)
 −−1
 − 
¶
+ ln  + ln(0)
whereas the second term on the right-hand side represents the equilibrium expression for
((−1)) Assume now further that  () = 1 −  so that  ∈ {} is the
diﬀerence between the average endowment and the endowment of the poor. Then, the
above expression can be approximated by the linear regression equation
 = 1 + 2−1 +  +  (8)
whereas 1 ≡ (− ) 2 ≡ −4((0)(−)) and 1+2  0 due to condition
(6). The sum of the constant terms is represented by  (which we allow to vary across
countries) and — as in equation (2) —  denotes an idiosyncratic error term which reflects
exogenous influences on private-sector output.11 Obviously, the key diﬀerence between the
theory-based equation (8) and the standard equation (2) is that the former also includes
lagged inequality, −1 while the latter just ignores earlier levels of inequality.12
We are now able to analytically determine the estimate of 1 if model (8) were true but
the impact of inequality were estimated based on the mis-specified regression equation
 = 1 +  +  (8’)
with  ≡  + 2−1 representing the “error term”. If we fit a regression line like
the one in Figure 2. (i.e., OLS based on diﬀerences), the estimated coeﬃcient converges
to 1 − 2(1 − ) as the number of observations goes to infinity; on the other hand, if
we consider a regression similar to that in Figure 2. (i.e., OLS based on levels), the
estimator of 1 converges to 1 + 2(2 − 1) Note that these limits become arbitrarily
close to 1 and 1+ 2, respectively, as  approaches 1. Thus, for a suﬃciently large num-
11The constant  may be country-specific due to, for instance, cross-country diﬀerences in the levels
of firm productivity (even though ( −  ) is constant across countries).
12There is a simple linear relationship between the present measure of inequality, , and the Gini
coeﬃcient (which is used in the empirical section). In particular, we have  =  · 100.
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ber of observations, the estimated coeﬃcient approximates (but overstates) the positive
short-run relationship when we rely on first diﬀerences while the level-based estimator
approximates (but understates) the negative overall (long run) consequences.
To explore whether this pattern is robust to the application of more advanced esti-
mation techniques, we go through a simple simulation exercise. In particular, we let the
model generate a panel dataset consisting of observations of the type () and then
estimate the mis-specified equation (8’) using the first-diﬀerence GMM and system GMM
techniques (Stata commands xtabond2 y D, gmmstyle(D) robust noleveleq and xtabond2
y D, gmmstyle(D) robust, respectively).13 It turns out that — in qualitative terms — the
results of this exercise are similar to the OLS results. In particular, we find the first-
diﬀerence GMM estimate to be positive while the system GMM estimate is negative;
moreover, as is the case with the OLS estimators, the first-diﬀerence GMM approach
overstates the true positive short-run eﬀect while the system GMM estimator understates
the negative overall consequences in the long run.
Stable supply of the public good. We now briefly focus on the case of stable supply
of the public good. According to Proposition 1, this situation is more likely to emerge in
richer economies where  is suﬃciently high to violate condition (7) so that  = +1 =
 = 1. Unless in the case of fluctuating supply, the estimation method should not aﬀect
the estimation results under these circumstances: A constant level of public investment
means that ∆ is identical zero so that 2 ≡ −4((0)( −)) = 0 As a result, the
standard regression equation (8’) is the “correctly” specified empirical model.
Looking at the evidence through the lens of the model. We end this section by
highlighting that our parsimonious model can “explain” important aspects of the empirical
picture that emerges in Section 2 (and in the broader inequality-growth literature). On
the one hand, given that the negative long-run eﬀects are quantitatively more important
13The parameters of the model are chosen such that (1 2) satisfies 1 − 2(1 − ) = 000216 and
1 + 2(2 − 1) = −000198, where 000216 and −000198 come from the OLS estimates (in diﬀerences
and levels) in our full country sample (and  is set to 09). Since the number of observations (OLS in
levels) is about 400 (and we have maximum eight observations per country), the simulation is based on
 = 50 and  = 8
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than the positive short-run eﬀects, the model can explain why diﬀerences-based and level-
based methods may come to opposite conclusions regarding the impact of inequality on
growth. Moreover, the model tells us how to interpret the diﬀerent estimation results:
If within-country inequality is rather persistent (which is actually true in our dataset,
see Footnote 3), the diﬀerences-based methods approximate the short-run eﬀect while
the level-based methods come close to mirroring the overall impact of inequality in the
long run. On the other hand, the model also provides an explanation for the fact that
there seems to be less of a discrepancy among high-income countries: In the model, more
productive economies are less likely to suﬀer from a strong negative “long-run” eﬀect of
higher inequality. As a result, when dealing with high-income countries, the standard
regression equation (8’) might be the right specification so that changes- and level-based
methods must lead to similar results.
4 Conclusions
This paper reconciles apparently contradictory findings in the empirical literature on
the inequality-growth relationship. Studies exploiting time-series variation consistently
find a positive relationship. Studies exploiting also cross-sectional variation tend to find a
negative link (except for the richest countries, in some cases). We use an expanded dataset
confirming this empirical finding. We then introduce a simple model which allows for both
positive and negative eﬀects of inequality, and we further assume that these eﬀects cluster
in a specific way. The growth-promoting eﬀects arise from purely economic mechanisms
(convex savings, capital market imperfections, innovation incentives) and tend to set in
relatively quickly, i.e., in the short or medium run. In contrast, growth-reducing eﬀects of
inequality involve the political process, the change of institutions, the rise of socio-political
movements, or they operate through changes in education systems and the educational
attainment of the population. Arguably, these eﬀects take much longer and materialize
primarily in the long run.
On the basis of our model, we can interpret the existing empirical results in a nat-
ural way: The diﬀerences-based estimation methods (i.e., the FE or first-diﬀerence GMM
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approaches) are likely to systematically pick up the beneficial short- or medium-run im-
plications — and thus tend to indicate a positive relationship. The level-based methods,
on the other hand, also reflect the slowly materializing (but potentially more powerful)
adverse consequences of inequality; thus, the mostly negative results associated with RE
or system GMM estimators should be interpreted as the overall eﬀect of inequality in the
long run. The fact that positive and the negative consequences of inequality manifest
themselves at diﬀerent points in time has implications for interpreting the empirical ev-
idence. Regression equations including just one (linear) inequality term are likely to be
mis-specified. According to our model, an appropriate equation should include several
Gini coeﬃcients which control for inequality at diﬀerent points in the past. Clearly, the
successful estimation of such equations requires long time series — and thus may become
feasible in the future.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) The first step is to introduce some notation. The value
function of a representative member of group  ∈ {} is denoted by  ( ) whereas
 and  are the two state variables. Thus, when thinking about the preferred level of
the public good tomorrow, the poor individuals (i.e., the decisive agents) have to solve
the recursive problem
  ( ) = max+1∈{01}
© ()() +  −+1 +  ©  (+1 +1)ªª 
A solution to this problem is a policy function +1 =  ( ) which gives tomorrow’s
level of the public good, +1 as a function of the two state variables.
We now prove that — if (7) holds — the proposed policy function is in fact a solution
to the recursive problem stated above (if condition 7 is violated, the equilibrium policy
functions can be derived in a parallel way). To do so, we have to establish that in any
given period  it is indeed optimal to stick to the policy function stated in the proposition
— provided that this policy function is applied in all future periods. More precisely, we
have to establish that — irrespective of the value of  — the representative poor agent
finds it optimal to choose (i) +1 = 1 if  =  and (ii) +1 = 0 if  =  (again,
provided that this rule is invariably applied in the future). The formal condition for point
(i) to hold is
  () =  ()() +  −  +  ¡  ( 1) + (1− )  ( 1)¢
≥  ()() +  +  ¡  ( 0) + (1− )  ( 0)¢ 
whereas the second line in the above expression gives the value if the decision is in favor
of the alternative choice, +1 = 0 Rearranging terms yields the much simpler restriction
 ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢+ (1− ) ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢ ≥  (A-1)
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which is indeed independent of  Similarly, for point (ii) to be true, we must have
 ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢+ (1− ) ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢   (A-2)
which is again independent of the current level of the public good, 
To proceed, we have to find explicit expressions for the diﬀerences   ( 1)−  ( 0)
and   ( 1)−  ( 0) which show up in (A-1) and (A-2). Assuming that the proposed
policy function is applied in all (future) periods, the two diﬀerences are given by
  ( 1)−   ( 0) =  () [(1)−(0)] 
with  ∈ {} Using this last expression in (A-1) and (A-2) completes the proof.
(ii) The second part of the proposition follows directly from condition (7).
28
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